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Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization
and Computation
Congress provided the treble damage provision of the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act' (RICO) as one of
the "new remedies" to deal with organized crime in the United
States, 2 a "highly sophisticated, diversified and widespread activity
that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by
unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corrup-
tion."3 Section 1964(c) of RICO creates a private cause of action
enabling "[any person 4 injured in his business or property5 by rea-
1 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)). Congress enacted RICO on Octo-
ber 15, 1970, as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
2 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (State-
ment of Findings and Purpose).
RICO's "legislative history clearly demonstrates that... [Congress] intended [RICO]
to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and
its economic roots." Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 302 (1983). "[T]he primary
purpose of RICO [was to address] the infiltration of legitimate businesses ...." United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981). Nevertheless, "courts are all but unanimous
in their refusal to read RICO as prohibiting only the infiltration of legitimate organizations
by racketeers." United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) (emphasis
added). As such, they faithfully reflect the teaching of Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590 ("unper-
suaded that Congress .. .confined [RICO to] only the infiltration of legitimate business")
(emphasis in original). Rejected, too, has been the notion that RICO "applies only to or-
ganized crime in the classic 'mobster' sense." United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026,
1030 (4th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980). Legitimate businesses
"enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its conse-
quences. The fact that § 1964(c) is used against respected businesses allegedly engaged in
a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming
[RICO] is being misconstrued." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Corp., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287
(1985).
3 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (Statement of
Findings and Purpose).
4 RICO defines person as any "individual or entity capable of holding a legal or bene-
ficial interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982). As such, it includes not only pri-
vate individuals, but public bodies. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hardin, 608 F.
Supp. 348 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (FDIC); Pennsylvania v. Cianfrani, 600 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (state government); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F.
Supp. 633, 644 (D. Alaska 1982) (local government).
5 Congress limited recovery to injury to business or property. See Drake v. B.F. Good-
rich Co., 782 F.2d 638 (6th Cir. 1986) (claim for toxic chemical personal injury and wrong-
ful death denied); Campbell v. A.H. Robins Co., 615 F. Supp. 496, 501 (W.D. Wis. 1985)
(claim for personal injuries in products liability claim dismissed); Local 355 v. Pier 66 Co.,
599 F. Supp. 761, 765 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (no RICO claim for incidental legal fees); Callan v.
State Chem. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp 619, 623 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (no RICO claim for mental
anguish, loss of self esteem, and confidence or damage to reputation). But see James v.
Meinke, 778 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1985) (consequential damages, even in absence of out-
of-pocket damages, may be recovered); Miller v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, Inc., 777 F.2d 496,
498-99 (9th Cir. 1985) (interference with expert witness depleted final settlement fund);
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son oP a violation of [RICO to] sue... [and] recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee. ' 7 While potential claimants have increased their use
of the civil RICO treble damage provision,8 several issues touching
on the character and computation of the treble damages remain
unanswered.
Issues concerning damages are generally resolved by classify-
ing the character of the recovery. Traditionally, damages have
been thought to fall into one of two mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive categories: compensatory9 or punitive.' 0 Because RICO treble
damages are a hybrid form of damages, however, they do not com-
fortably fit within either category."
Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 770 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1985) (on remand
after Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985)) (damages include legal ex-
penses and damage to business reputation), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 799 (1986).
6 "[B]y reason of" language simply imposes a proximate cause requirement on plain-
tiffs. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984),
aft'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985). See also Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969)
("causal connection" in antitrust).
7 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
8 One commentator noted that only thirteen cases involving civil RICO had been pub-
lished by 1981. See Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1101 n.7 (1982). No separate statistics on RICO litigation are kept by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. It may be possible, however, to make
estimates from the information published. See generally ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1983). Approximately
250,000 civil cases are filed each year. Id. at 122. Private litigants filed slightly more than
145,000 of the civil cases. Id. at 121. All forms of extortion, racketeering, and threat of
prosecutions amounted to 478. Id. at 320. Securities, commodities, and exchange related
civil filings made up 3,000. Id. at 164. Fraud related filings made up 2,000. Id. at 345.
Accordingly, if most securities and fraud cases were also RICO cases, RICO filings would
approximate 5,000, less than 2%6 of all federal filings. In addition, the Department ofJus-
tice estimated that 657 of all civil RICO filings had an independent basis of federal juris-
diction. Accordingly, the litigation seems to be neither wholly new nor of floodgate
proportions. See also ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF
THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 55 (1985) (one reported civil RICO case in 1972;
nine reported decisions before 1980; 300 published and unpublished opinions on civil
RICO by 1985; only nine reported cases in which treble damages awarded).
9 Compensatory damages are awarded primarily to compensate victims for their inju-
ries. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 comment a (1979); W. HALE, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES 3 (1896). They are automatically awarded upon the establishment of
the fact, cause, and extent of the harm. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAM-
AGES § 14 (1935).
10 Punitive damages are awarded to punish egregious conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 908 (1979); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2
(5th ed. 1984). They are within the discretion of the jury to award based upon the degree
of wrongfulness of the conduct and the defendant's wealth. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at
§ 84; K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.7 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
11 See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 313-17 (1976); Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 666-79 (1892). For a discussion of the hybrid nature of RICO treble dam-
ages, see Goering, The Characterization of Treble Damages: Conflict Between a Hybrid Mode of
Recovery and Jurisprudence of Labels, in TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
OF ORGANIZED CRIME: MATERIALS ON RICO 428 (G. Robert Blakey ed. 1980). See also ABA
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Like compensatory damages, treble damages are mandatory
once the victim establishes liability and the extent of the harm.' 2
While treble damages are awarded to compensate the victim, they
go beyond the scope of compensatory damages and make the vic-
tim whole for any accumulative harm.' 3 Unlike punitive damages,
treble damages are not discretionary either in award or amount, 14
they are not based upon an amount adjudged necessary to punish
or deter, ' 5 and they are not commensurate with the willful, wanton,
or reckless conduct of the wrongdoer. 16 As such, RICO treble
damages are neither awarded for the same reasons nor in the same
manner as either compensatory or punitive damages. Rules that
have developed reflecting the traditional dichotomy of compensa-
tory or punitive damages, if mechanically applied to RICO,
threaten, therefore, to frustrate its multi-faceted character. Instead,
courts should develop rules under RICO in accord with Congress'
intent that its treble damage provision serve its broad remedial
purposes.
Part I of this note analyzes RICO's purposes in light of its legis-
lative history and its statutory language. The purposes of the treble
damage provision are then used as a framework against which is-
sues touching upon treble damages can be appropriately resolved.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, A COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RICO
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 116-25 (1985).
12 See note 27 infra and accompanying text. See also Edwards v. Travelers Ins., 563 F.2d
105, 118-19 (6th Cir. 1977) (Tenn. law; mandatory); Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429
F.2d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 1970) (antitrust mandatory), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971); Mc-
Mahon Food Co. v. Call, 406 N.E.2d 1206 (Ind. App. 1980) (IND. CODE § 34-4-30-1 (1976);
treble damages for theft mandatory).
13 Accumulative harm is that harm falling outside the range of legal damages, too elu-
sive and indeterminate for adequate measurement by traditional damage principles. See
Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 154 (1899) (inherent difficulty in proving the amount of dam-
ages actually sustained); Beacon Folding Machine Co. v. Rotary Machine Co., 17 F.2d 934,
935 (D. Mass. 1927) (multiple damages provide adequate compensation when strict rules of
law would not afford it); Burnett v. Ward, 42 Vt. 80, 84-85 (1869) (remedial statute allows
recovery of accumulative damages for sheep killing). See generally Vold, Are Threefold Damages
Under the Antitrust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940).
While courts refer to the award of single damages as actual damages, they are more
accurately labeled "legal" damages. A plaintiff may suffer actual harm for which the law will
not provide damages; for example, mental distress. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 10, at § 12. Moreover, the burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff to prove a legal
injury, proximate cause, and reasonable certainty as to the amount may exclude certain
types of harm from recovery. Finally, the opportunity costs and psychological effort associ-
ated with litigation are not recoverable. Accordingly, accumulative damages compensate
plaintiffs for actual harm not otherwise recoverable as legal damages.
14 See note 27 infra and accompanying text; Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442
N.E.2d 349, 358-65 (Ind. 1982) (punitive damages discretionary with jury).
15 See, e.g., Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 653, 658-59 (Mont.
1981) (punitive damages may not be reduced by comparative negligence since their pur-
pose is to punish).
16 See, e.g., Smith v. Miliken, 247 Ga. 369, 371-72, 276 S.E.2d 35, 37-38 (1981) (purpose
of exemplary damages regulates amount).
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With this framework in mind, Part II discusses several issues that
may be expected to arise in RICO litigation dealing with characteri-
zation. Part II suggests solutions to these issues based upon the
underlying purposes of RICO. Part III then considers several
problems surrounding the computation of treble damages, again
suggesting solutions to these problems based upon the underlying
purposes of RICO. 17
I. A Framework For Resolving Issues Concerning Treble
Damages Under RICO
A. Congressional Intent
Congress modeled RICO's treble damage provision, section
1964(c), after the antitrust treble damage provision, section 4 of the
Clayton Act.' 8 Congress did this to reflect the necessary remedial
scheme that would "curtail-and eventually. . . eradicate- the vast
expansion of organized crime's economic power."' 19 To avoid the
17 The topics discussed in this note do not exhaust the issues that touch on the charac-
ter or computation of treble damages under RICO. Issues not discussed in this note but
which can be similarly resolved according to the purposes of RICO include: (1) in pari
delicto as a defense; see, e.g., Eichler v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2628-29 (1985) (§ 10(b) of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 not limited by common law in pari delicto); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1968) (common law inpari
delicto rule rejected for antitrust), overruled on other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v. Indepen-
dence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); (2) the informing of thejury of the presence of the
treble factor; see, e.g., Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1242-43
(5th Cir. 1974) (antitrust; no), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); (3) the duty to mitigate; see,
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982) (must minimize equal employment
damages); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1979) (mitigate damages); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979) (mitigate damages); (4) the burden of proof;
see generally Note, Civil RICO: Prior Criminal Conviction and Btrden of Proof, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 566 (1985); (5) the treatment of treble damages in bankruptcy; and (6) the measure of
damages; compare Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125, 129-30 (1889) (fraud; naturally and proxi-
mately out of pocket) with DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378, 1384 (N.D.
Ill. 1984) (includes benefit of bargain, i.e., lost profits) and Wilkinson v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 23, 29 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("property" not limited to
business and includes loss of stock value).
18 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
19 116 CONG. REC. 35,193 (Sen. Poff), 35,196 (Cong. Celler), 36,296 (1970). See
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 237, 276 n.1 17 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Civil Action] (cited with approval in Rus-
sello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 303 (1983)). See also Organized Crime Control, Hearings
on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 538, 543-44 (1970).
RICO's legislative history began in 1951 with the Kefauver Committee, whose focus
included infiltration by organized criminal elements into legitimate businesses. In 1967,
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recom-
mended that Congress adopt antitrust-type remedies to control underworld activities, par-
ticularly in legitimate businesses. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: FINAL
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 208 (1967). In response, Senator Hruska and Congressman (nowJustice) Poff in-
troduced companion legislation that included criminal and civil sanctions and public and
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restrictive precedence of the antitrust laws, however, but make full
use of the remedial scheme of the treble damage provision, Con-
gress enacted section 1964(c) separate from the Clayton Act.20
Congress provided guidelines for interpreting RICO and the
treble damage provision. RICO's legislative history, statutory lan-
guage, and statutory construction consistently reflect Congress' in-
tent that RICO's treble damage provision serve broad remedial
purposes. 2 1
Because the language of the statute is the most reliable evi-
dence of congressional intent, it is the place to begin the analysis. 22
Absent ambiguity or a clearly expressed contrary intent, the lan-
guage of the statute is conclusive evidence of Congress' intent.23
Congress' intent is nowhere more clearly expressed than in subsec-
tion 904(a) of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
This subsection directs that RICO's "provisions ... shall be liber-
ally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 24 This directive
reflects several aspects of Congress' intent. First, it specifically in-
structs the courts to construe RICO's provisions liberally. 25 Sec-
private enforcement mechanisms in both Houses of Congress. See, e.g., S. 2048, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 113 CONG. REC. 17,999 (1967). The ABA reviewed the bills and
endorsed their concepts, but recommended that Congress draft them outside of the anti-
trust statutes to give them a broader impact. Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on
S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1816, S. 2022, S. 2122, S. 2292 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 259 (statement), 556 (report) (1969) (House Hearings at 537 (statement), 556 (re-
port)) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 301. Subsequently, Senator Hruska and Congress-
man Poff drafted and introduced new legislation in both houses that followed the ABA's
recommendation. See, e.g., S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 6995-96
(1969). Senator McClellan introduced S. 30 based on a number of recommendations of the
President's Crime Commission. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 769
(1969). S. 1861 was integrated into S. 30 as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 and passed by both Houses of Congress and signed into law on October 15, 1970.
116 CONG. REC. 36,296 (1970). Based upon the recommendations of the ABA, the treble
damage provision that had not appeared in S. 1861 was restored in the House. See Civil
Action, supra, at 275 n. 115. For a thorough treatment of RICO's legislative history, see Civil
Action, supra, at 249-80; Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L. REV. 1009, 1014-20
(1980). But see ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE
AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 122-26 (1985) (criticizing Blakey).
20 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985). See also 115 CONG.
REC. 6995, 9567 (1969); 116 CONG. REC. 972 (1970).
21 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1970) (The HouseJudiciary
Committee noted that § 1964 "contain[ed] broad remedial provisions for reform.").
22 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
23 Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 299 (1983) (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at
580).
24 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922, 947.
25 See generally Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167
(1980).
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ond, it classifies RICO as a remedial measure. 26 Third, the plural
form of "purposes" reflects Congress' awareness of the multi-di-
mensional purposes of RICO. Finally, its use of the word "shall"
mandates that courts follow this directive in interpreting RICO.27
Further, Congress recognized that RICO would overlap other re-
medial schemes. Congress provided that "[n]othing in RICO shall
supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing
criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those
provided for" in RICO.28 Thus, RICO's remedial scheme, includ-
ing the treble damage provision, supplements, but does not sup-
plant, existing federal or state law that may redress similar
26 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1969) ("remedial rather than penal").
When Congress classifies a remedy as not "penal," courts will not lightly re-examine the
question. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1980) (civil penalty classified as
such for all purposes, including self-incrimination); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 148, 150-54 (1956) (Court would not transform double damage provision of Property
Surplus Act of 1944 into a criminal penalty since Congress characterized it as remedial);
Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903) (if it is clearly the will of Congress that
the provision not be regarded as a penalty, a court must be governed by that will). That
classification overrides the federal common law that may have pointed in the other direc-
tion. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-15 (1981) (statute controls over
federal common law).
27 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935) (use of the word "shall" in the statute,
though not entirely controlling, is of significant importance and indicates an intention that
the statute shall be construed as mandatory). See also Minor v. Mechanics Bank of Alexan-
dria, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 46, 64 (1828) ("ordinary meaning of the language must be presumed
to be intended"; construction must give effect to the true intent and object of the legisla-
ture in the enactment of the statute). But see Summers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 592 F.
Supp. 1240, 1242 (W.D. Okla. 1984) ("Although Congress used the verb 'shall' in
§ 1964(c), it is not necessarily mandatory.") (citing 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 57.03 (1973)). Contrary to the court's use of C. SANDS, supra, in
Summers, § 57.03 also states that the form of the verb used in a statute is the single most
important contextual consideration in determining whether a statute is mandatory or dis-
cretionary. Sands concedes that it is not the sole determinant and that its natural connota-
tion can be overcome by other considerations. Nonetheless, the ordinary meaning of the
work impliedly indicating Congress' intent "should always be favored." Id.
28 Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(b), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970); see Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 392 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Congress enacted
RICO in order to supplement, not supplant, the available remedies since it thought those
remedies offered too little protection for the victims."), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985). See
also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983) (Marshall,J.) (cumulative
construction furthers broad remedial purposes). But see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105
S. Ct. 3292, 3293-96 (1985) (Marshall,J, dissenting) (RICO federalizes state law claims and
displaces or supersedes federal remedial schemes); Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299,
1308 (D. Colo. 1984) (RICO claim dismissed where adequate state remedy).
1986] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
conduct. 29 Congress itself has set the context within which RICO
must be construed in its attack on sophisticated crime.30
B. Supreme Court Interpretation of RICO
Since its enactment, the United States Supreme Court has
noted that RICO is "both preventative and remedial." 3' In Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,32 the Supreme Court, in reflecting upon
RICO's legislative history, observed that the "legislative statements
about novel remedies and attacking crime on all fronts ... [reflect
the spirit in which] all of the Act's provisions should be read." 33
The court continued by stating that:
RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Con-
gress' self-consciously expansive language and overall approach
... but also of its admonition that RICO is to "be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes." The statute's "re-
medial purposes" are nowhere more evident than in the
provision of a private action for those injured by racketeering
injury.34
29 Such provisions are common features of federal legislation. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7 7p
(1982) (securities), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982) (ERISA), and 15 U.S.C. 2072(c) (1982)
(consumer products). As such, RICO does not, for example, preempt state legislation. See
Alvers v. State of Indiana, 489 N.E.2d 83 (Ind. App. 1986) (Indiana antiracketeering law
not preempted by federal RICO).
30 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 392 (RICO enacted to supplement, not supplant, available reme-
dies).
The liberal construction directive in RICO has its roots in efforts in the nineteenth
century to undo legislative reform. Judicial hostility at that time to reform efforts were
reflected in the "abstract canons of statutory interpretation . . .: strict construction of
statutes in derogation of the common law; [and] strict construction of penal statutes ....
The effect was to put a primarily obstructive if not destructive connotation on the process
of statutory interpretation." W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 186 (1950). Legis-
latures reacted: "[Ilt became standard practice in drafting statutes to insert a preamble
stating broadly the purpose of the act and to close with a provision declaring that the stat-
ute should be liberally construed." D. WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAw 174
(1974). See also E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAw 421 (1951).
The rule of strict construction in federal law is not of constitutional status. Tarrant v.
Ponte, 751 F.2d 459, 465-66 (Ist Cir. 1985). It is merely a principle of statutory construc-
tion. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980). FCC v. American Broadcasting
Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954), cannot be fairly cited for the proposition that civil provisions
that play a role in the imposition of criminal sanctions must be narrowly construed, since
the Supreme Court refused to follow it in Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411
U.S. 356, 373-75 (1975) ("We cannot agree ... that every section of an act establishing a
broad regulatory scheme must be construed as a 'penal' provison ... merely because two
sections of the Act... provide for civil and criminal penalties." Id. at 375.).
31 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 517, 593 (1981). See also United States v. Cap-
petto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). But see Saine v.
A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (D. Colo. 1984) (treble damage statutes, like criminal
statutes, must be strictly construed; ambiguities should be resolved in favor of lenity).
32 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
33 Id. at 3286.
34 Id.
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The Supreme Court has thus endorsed Congress' guidelines
for interpreting RICO and its provisions.3 5 The Court has been
faithful to the liberal construction clause and consistent in looking
first to the purposes and goals of RICO before resolving issues con-
cerning the application of the provisions of the statute.3 6
C. The Treble Damage Provision
Congress' general directive to liberally construe all of RICO's
provisions and the Supreme Court's instruction to read RICO
broadly are particularly pertinent to the treble damage provision.37
That courts must liberally construe RICO and that RICO should
supplement other available remedies provide explicit guidelines for
resolving questions about section 1964(c). Similarly, the Supreme
Court's language about RICO's broad remedial purposes suggests
that courts use the treble damage provision to fulfill the remedial
goals of RICO in fighting crime.
Treble damages have unique characteristics that can be cre-
atively used to address the problems of sophisticated crime.38
Treble damages can be used to (1) encourage private citizens to
bring RICO actions,39 (2) deter future violators, 40 and (3) compen-
35 Id. (RICO is to be read broadly); Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983)
(RICO is remedial); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 (RICO "shall be liberally construed").
36 Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284 (noted Congress' underlying concerns); Turkette, 452 U.S.
at 590 ("In view of the purposes and goals of the Act .... ").
37 Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14 ("language [in another part of the Act] may be useful
in interpreting other sections of the Act").
38 Treble damages blend features of compensatory damages and deterrence to create
an effective remedial tool. They compensate the victim, but unlike traditional damages,
they also compensate for accumulative harm. By providing full compensation for all legal
and accumulative harm, they further act as an incentive to private citizens to bring suit
against RICO violators and, since they are mandatory, they create a strong deterrent. See
notes 11-16 supra and accompanying text.
The way to deter any activity is to make its costs larger than its benefits. See R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 164 (2d ed. 1977). Deterrence is not, however, unique to
treble damages; it is a common feature of all damages. Compensatory damages also deter.
Id. at 154. Indeed, compensatory damages may sometimes produce the amount of deter-
rence necessary to inhibit wrongful conduct. Id. at 143. When they do not, multiple dam-
ages can be used to ensure that the expected benefits discounted by the likelihood of
getting caught will not exceed the anticipated costs, including opportunity costs and poten-
tial liability costs. R. POSNER, ANTrrRusT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 226 (1976). For
other views regarding an economic analysis of the law, see Coffee, Corporate Crime and Pun-
ishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419
(1980); K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOM-
ics (1976).
39 Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285; Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979)
("Congress created the treble-damages remedy.., precisely for the purpose of encourag-
ingprivate challenges to ... violations.") (emphasis in original) (apropos of § 4 of the Clay-
ton Act); Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965); Alcorn County v. U.S.
Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1984) (incentives to enlist the aid of
civil claimants in deterring racketeering). See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw
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sate victims for all accumulative harm.4 1 These multiple and con-
vergent purposes make the treble damage provision a powerful
mechanism in the effort to vindicate the interests of those victim-
ized by crime.
Identifying these elements as goals for the treble damage pro-
vision and then striving to meet them increases enforcement, which
increases the likelihood of violators being caught; discourages
other violators, which will reduce the amount of sophisticated crime
committed in the future; and makes victims whole again, which re-
lieves the crippling effect of crime.42 By recognizing that they can
use RICO's treble damage provision to spur litigation, compensate,
and deter, courts will consider the provision expansively as a means
of dealing effectively with crime. Thus, courts should resolve issues
concerning treble damage awards with these three purposes in
mind. Only then can the broad, far-reaching intent of Congress be
fully accomplished. 43
II. Issues Turning on the Nature of the Treble Damage Award
Several issues arise in litigation that touch on the characteriza-
tion of the relief sought. Because Congress characterized RICO as
remedial and directed that the statute be construed broadly, the fol-
lowing issues should be resolved according to that characterization
and consistent with a liberal construction of the treble damage
provision.
A. Survival
When the plaintiff in a RICO action dies prior to judgment, the
question arises whether the representatives of the plaintiff's estate
may continue to pursue the RICO cause of action. Alternatively,
400, 462 (1977) (receipt of damages necessary to give victim incentive to shoulder the bur-
dens involved in the enforcement of law).
40 Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 303 (1983). See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 221-222 (1976).
41 Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (Congress sought to provide
ample compensation to victims of antitrust violations). "Adequate relief or compensation
is the main goal." S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1273 (1981) (a later Congress,
recodifying the laws, reiterated the goals of RICO). See also note 13 supra; R. POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 221-22 (1976).
42 See 115 CONG. REC. 5874 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan); Healings on S. 30,
supra note 19, at 497. Like the antitrust laws, RICO creates a "private enforcement mecha-
nism that . . . deter[s] violators . . . and provide[s] ample compensation to the victims
.... Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
43 Roscoe Pound suggests that the goal of law should be to "secure all interests so far
as possible with the least sacrifice of the totality of interests or the scheme of intersts as a
whole." 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 330-34 (1959). Accordingly, courts should attempt to
secure the three interests of RICO's treble damages without sacrificing any one element or
frustrating the statutory scheme of RICO.
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when the defendant in a RICO action dies prior to judgment, the
question becomes whether the defendant's estate will be liable for
the RICO treble damages judgment. The answers to these ques-
tions have traditionally depended upon the characterization of the
damages sought.44 A claim for compensatory damages usually sur-
vives the death of the plaintiff or the defendant, whereas a claim for
punitive damages does not survive.45 A civil RICO cause of action,
however, involves an award of treble damages which is neither com-
pensatory nor punitive in nature.46 Therefore, traditional analysis
does not resolve the question of survival of a RICO cause of action
for treble damages.
Analysis of this issue in light of the legislative history and the
statutory language indicates that RICO claims for treble damages
ought to survive the defendant's death.47 RICO is a remedial mea-
sure. To encourage private citizens to bring suit and to assure vic-
tims full compensation for their injury, treble damage actions
should survive.48 Otherwise, the defendant's estate would retain
44 See, e.g., Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884) (action for penalties and for-
feitures does not survive death of plaintiff).
Under a federal statute, survival is a question of federal law. Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (under federal civil rights statute survival is a question of federal law).
See Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 210 (1955) (action underJones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982),
survives death of a tortfeasor in light of Congress' express intent to provide for seamen);
Moore v. Backus, 78 F.2d 571, 575 (7th Cir. 1935) (antitrust action survives death of in-
jured party based on 4 Edw. 3, allowing survival of actions against trespassers to recover
damages). But see RSE, Inc. v. H & M, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 185, 186-87 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (treble
damages under antitrust not recoverable from defendant's estate; cases cited).
45 1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 710 (9th ed. 1912).
Courts justified this distinction by stating that when the defendant was deceased the dam-
ages would no longer serve as punishment. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 10, at §§ 125A-127.
Some state statutes and case law, however, provide for the survival of all actions. See,
e.g., IND. CODE § 34-1-1-1 (1976); Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla.
1969) (survival of all actions in Florida); Davis v. State er rel. Long, 119 Ind. 555, 557, 22
N.W. 9, 10 (1839) (including penalties).
46 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
47 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 677-83 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
The court concluded that RICO treble damages are remedial in nature. Both the underly-
ing action and the claim for treble damages survived the defendant's death. But see Sum-
mers v. FDIC, 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (treble damages do not survive
beyond actual damages against receiver). The District Court of the United States for the
Western District of Oklahoma correctly decided that treble damages should not survive
against a receiver of a defunct bank; however, it erroneously based its holding on the char-
acterization of treble damages as penal. RICO's treble damages are remedial. They should
not survive against the receiver of a defunct bank because, as between two innocent par-
ties-the plaintiff and the receiver-the receiver should not bear the burden of the loss. See
Holly v. Missionary Soc'y of the Protestant Episcopal Church, 180 U.S. 284, 295 (1901)
(Court will not transfer loss to another equally innocent party).
48 To make recovery dependent upon the defendant's survival would discourage plain-
tiffs from initiating and pursuing RICO causes of action. In addition to denying victims
compensation for their injuries, this would reduce enforcement of RICO. Without the aid
of private citizens enforcing RICO, the responsibility would lie with governmental agencies
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any benefit gained from unlawful activity while denying the victim
his right to recovery. A rule that dismisses a plaintiff's claim upon
the death of the defendant may also encourage the murder of RICO
defendants .49
To completely remove the corrupting influence of organized
crime, courts should also keep the treble damage remedy available
to the plaintiff's estate in spite of the plaintiff's death. Courts
should not leave the plaintiffs estate uncompensated because of
the fortuitous death of the plaintiff.50 Furthermore, to dismiss a
claim upon the death of the plaintiff could encourage defendants,
fearful of a substantial treble damage judgment, to seek their own
remedy and kill the plaintiff, especially if the defendants are con-
nected to organized crime. The civil provisions must continue to
pose a threat to all RICO defendants regardless of the presence of a
live plaintiff.5 1
whose resources are already limited. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284; TASK FORCE ON ORGAN-
IZED CRIME FOR THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OFJUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 14-15 (1967). To illustrate the extent
of private enforcement, between 1960 and 1980, of the 22,585 civil and criminal cases
brought under the antitrust provisions, 84% were instituted by private plaintiffs. U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OFJUSTICE SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 431 (1981). Less en-
forcement would also minimize the broad deterrent effect on those who engage in unlawful
conduct.
49 On June 5, 1981, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., a victim of a fraudulent settlement
claim which was part of an arson-for-profit scheme, filed a RICO action to recover $46,000
in treble damages. On November 21, 1981, one of the defendants was found murdered in
Las Vegas with a single bullet through his head. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Caton, 540
F. Supp. 673, 674-675 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
In organized crime groups, nominees may be used to hold property belonging to other
members of the organization. Where the nominee is being sued under RICO and the prop-
erty actually belongs to another member of the organized crime group, the actual property
owner may have an incentive to kill the defendant if the RICO suit will be dismissed upon
the defendant's death. Other members of the group may also have an incentive to kill the
defendant if the RICO lawsuit will expose other members of the group to liability.
A facet of contemporary organized crime violence indicative of the extent to which
some will go to avoid prosecution and liability is the violence directed towards judicial and
prosecutorial officials. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1982, at 10, col. I (conviction of killers
of Judge John H. Wood, Jr.); id., March 14, 1982, at 18, col. 3 (review of plots against
judges, prosecutors, and investigators taking part in drug cases); id., April 16, 1982, at 7,
col. 6 (indictment of"narcotics smuggler and a hired killer.., on charges of murdering the
Federal DistrictJudge" scheduled to preside over a drug case against them). This violence
redirected towards defendants in a civil RICO suit would allow organized crime members
to control which suits are litigated by virtue of their decision to kill the defendant.
50 It would be quite inequitable to deny any remedy because of death or corporate
dissolution of the party to representatives of an individual whose business was destroyed.
United Copper Securities v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 F. 574, 578 (2d Cir. 1916)
(antitrust).
51 See 127 CONG. REC. 28,217 (1981) (in 1980, 23,000 murders; in 1979, only 73 % of
the murders were cleared by arrest; 1,280 organized crime killings). See also Sen. Special
Comm. to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Interim Rep., S. REP. No. 307, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1951); Organized Crime & Use of Violence: Hearings Before P enianent Snib-
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Allowing the treble damage provision to survive the death of
either the plaintiff or defendant ensures active enforcement and
strong deterrence which, in turn, enhances RICO's remedial effort.
B. Summary Judgment
Generally, a party may obtain an award of damages by sum-
mary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure if the amount of damages is not in dispute.52 A plaintiff
cannot recover punitive damages on summary judgment, however,
because punitive damages are within the discretion of the jury.53
Based on this distinction, courts should allow plaintiffs to recover
RICO treble damages on a motion for summary judgment. Like
compensatory damages, RICO treble damages are mandatory and
automatically awarded once the plaintiff proves the fact, cause, and
extent of the injury.54 In addition, the amount of plaintiff's dam-
ages are automatically trebled and involve no discretion on the part
of the jury or the court. Furthermore, nothing in the language of
Rule 56 prohibits recovery of treble damages where the amount is
not in dispute.55 Thus, to reduce costs of litigation and increase
efficiency, once a plaintiff establishes liability and if the amount of
damages are not at issue,56 courts should award treble damages
upon a motion for summary judgment. Merely trebling the dam-
ages should not alone bar granting a motion for summary judgment
on the damages issue.
comm. on Investigation of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. Parts I &
2 (1980); note 48 supra.
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 437 F.2d 666 (D.D.C.
1970) (summary judgment awarded to plaintiff for damages, reimbursable expenses, and
costs of the action); United States v. Natale, 99 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1950) (summary
judgment granted to plaintiff for treble damages under Housing and Rent Act of 1947).
53 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at § 85.
54 The civil remedy provision of RICO states that "treble damages shall be recovered."
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added). See note 27 supra; Locklin v. Day-Glo Color
Corp., 429 F.2d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 1970) (antitrust mandatory), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020
(1971).
55 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
56 Courts do not favor summary judgment in antitrust litigation because of the multiple
and complex issues that are usually involved. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). However, in actions involving per se antitrust violations, sum-
mary judgment may be appropriate. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392,
396 (1947). Thus, in RICO suits where the plaintiff has previously established a substantive
RICO violation through a criminal RICO proceeding and the damage amount is readily
ascertainable, summary judgment may be appropriate. But see Cook County v. Lynch, 620
F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (indictment and conviction order were not sufficient
basis for granting motion for summary judgment).
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C. Tax Consequences
Many claimants are now filing civil RICO suits against corpora-
tions and businesses. 57 When the RICO defendant's activities qual-
ify as a trade or business under the tax code, businesses may seek to
deduct from their income a RICO judgment as an ordinary and
necessary business expense.58 Thus, the issue arises as to whether
RICO treble damages should be deductible for federal income tax
purposes. In addition to meeting the statutory requirements of be-
ing ordinary and necessary,59 case law has imposed an additional
requirement that the deduction not frustrate a sharply defined pub-
lic policy as evidenced by a governmental declaration. 60
Under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) the
payment of a fine or penalty to the government,61 and two-thirds of
an antitrust judgment, is not deductible as an ordinary and neces-
sary business expense.62 This section, however, does not provide
for the treatment of other multiple damage awards, including RICO
treble damages. RICO treble damages are not a fine or penalty
paid to the government for the violation of any law, and thus
should not be disallowed as a business expense deduction under
57 See, e.g., Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667
(W.D. Mich. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Barker
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
58 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1982). Section 162(a) allows as a deduction "all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business .... ; see Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935) (civil judgment
arising out of business matter allowable as deduction; taxpayer deducted amount paid in
settlement of a judgment for cancellation of a lease for fraud and restitution).
A RICO treble damage payment must, however, meet the general test for determining
the deductibility of a business expense. Thus, the payment of a RICO treble damage judg-
ment must not be for a capital item, must be proximately related to the business of the
taxpayer and not another person, must be ordinary and necessary and, in the case of an
individual, must not be personal to him. See 4A MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAx
§ 25.71 (1985 & Supp. 1986). Courts cannot establish a general rule as to the deductibility
of the payment of RICO damages as a business expense because the tax treatment of such a
payment must be made on a case-by-case basis depending upon the nature of the claim in
respect of which payment is made. Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429,
433 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
59 Before Congress codified the antitrust exception in § 162(g), the Internal Revenue
Service found antitrust payments to be ordinary and necessary within the meaning of § 162.
Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 C.B. 52.
60 Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1952).
61 26 U.S.C. § 162(f) (1982) provides: "No deduction shall be allowed under subsec-
tion (a) for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law."
62 26 U.S.C. § 16 2 (g) (1982) provides:
If in a criminal proceeding a taxpayer is convicted of a violation of the antitrust
laws, or his plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an indictment or information
charging such a violation is entered or accepted in such a proceeding, no deduc-
tion shall be allowed under subsection (a) for two-thirds of any amount paid or
incurred.
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section 162(o of the IRC. Congress modeled RICO's treble dam-
age provision after the Clayton Act's damage provision;63 and,
therefore, the two provisions might be treated similarly under sec-
tion 162(g) of the IRC. An analogy between the purposes and con-
gressional intent of RICO treble damages and antitrust treble
damages, however, is not complete enough to suggest that they
should be treated the same.64 Nonetheless, while the statutory lan-
guage does not expressly disallow a deduction for RICO treble
damages, 65 such a deduction should not be allowed on public policy
grounds.
RICO treble damages present a classic case for applying the
public policy exception to the business expense deduction. In Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,66 the Supreme Court applied a
public policy test and disallowed the deduction of fines imposed for
violation of state maximum truck weight laws. Even though the ex-
penses may have been "necessary," the Court disallowed them be-
cause allowing the deduction would frustrate state policy by
diluting the penalty for violating the law.67 Similarly, to permit a
RICO violator to gain a tax advantage through deducting the
amount of the payment, thereby minimizing the degree of impact,
would minimize the deterrent effect and frustrate the purpose and
63 See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
64 While their language may be similar, Congress specifically enacted RICO outside the
antitrust laws. Moreover, in early antitrust cases, when the courts developed many of the
rules concerning the treatment of antitrust treble damages, the courts considered treble
damages a penalty designed to punish violators of the antitrust laws. Sun Theatre Corp. v.
RKO Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1954) (penal). Modern cases discuss anti-
trust treble damages as a remedy for victims of antitrust violations; see American Soc'y of
Mech. Eng., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 574-75 (1982) (antitrust treble damage
provision designed in part to punish past violators, to deter, and to provide a remedy for
the victims of antitrust); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). Congress specifi-
cally classified RICO as a remedial statute. See also Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes, and Dam-
age Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAx. L. REv. 611, 615 (1970).
65 The Senate Finance Committee, commenting on the codified exceptions in § 162, in
fact, described them as "all inclusive." S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274
(1969).
66 356 U.S. 30 (1958). See also Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38
(1958).
67 Tank Truck Rentals, 356 U.S. at 35. Congress codified this public policy exception in
section 162(0. Statutory penalties are not deductible from gross income because a penalty
is a punishment inflicted by the state upon those who commit acts violative of the fixed
public policy of the sovereign. To permit the violator to gain a tax advantage through
deducting the amount of the judgment as a business expense, and thus to mitigate the
degree of his punishment, would frustrate the purpose and effectiveness of that public pol-
icy. Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir.) (anti-
trust), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945). While RICO treble damages are not a punishment
inflicted by the government, they are used to impose liability upon those who violate the
public policy of the sovereign. To allow a RICO defendant to mitigate the amount of his
liability by allowing him to deduct the RICO judgment as a business expense would frus-
trate the purpose and effectiveness of that policy.
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effectiveness of RICO. While treble damages provide compensa-
tion to the person harmed, they serve the additional purpose of de-
terrence.68 As with fines and penalties, removing the threat of the
full impact of treble damages would give potential RICO defend-
ants less reason to avoid such unlawful conduct.
D. Insurance
The terms of a particular insurance policy 69 and state law70
usually dictate the scope of insurance coverage. When a policy is
ambiguous or silent on the coverage of RICO treble damages, how-
ever, the courts may have to decide the availability of insurance
coverage. 7 1 A general explicit exception that limits coverage to for-
tuitous losses precludes insurance coverage for RICO treble dam-
ages. 72 On the other hand, under the doctrine of construction that
requires that courts interpret ambiguities against the drafter-in-
surer,73 RICO treble damage awards may be covered. The inquiry
does not stop here, however. Even though the terms of a policy
may allow coverage of RICO treble damages, courts still have to
face the broader question of whether allowing coverage of RICO
treble damages violates public policy.7 4
Most policies cover compensatory damage awards but exclude
from coverage punitive damages. 75 Because RICO treble damages
are neither compensatory nor punitive,76 courts should decide the
issue based upon the policies behind the RICO treble damage
68 See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
69 The standard insurance policy provides coverage for "all sums which the insured
may become legally obligated to pay as damages" because of bodily injury or property
damage. See generally 1 J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 7
(1985); King, The Insurability of Punitive Damages: A New Solution To An Old Dilemma, 16 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345 (1980).
70 Compare Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1
(1964) (compensatory and punitive damages covered by insurance) with Northwestern Nat'l
Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (only compensatory damages covered by
insurance in Florida).
71 See 1 J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 69, § 72.25. Whether an insurance policy
covers statutory multiple damages varies depending upon the court's interpretation of the
statute as to its purpose and nature, the type of acts covered, and the policy of the jurisdic-
tion relative to the effect and purpose of multiple damages. Id.
72 R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw § 5.4, at 288 (1974) (a requirement that
the loss be accidental to qualify for liability of an insurer is implicit, when not express,
because of the very nature of insurance).
73 Alcoa S.S. Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 421, 425 (1949) (contract to be strictly
construed against the drafter).
74 See, e.g., Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595
(1978).
75 See 1 J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 69, § 7.02. But see King, supra note 69; K.
REDDEN, supra note 10, at § 9.1 (list of state jurisdictions permitting insurance coverage for
punitive damages).
76 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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award and the overall goal of the RICO statute. The court used this
approach in Northwestern Casualty Co. v. McNulty 77 in declining cover-
age for punitive damages. The court reasoned that if the insurer
paid the punitive damages, the defendant would not be punished,
but rather society as a whole would pay through higher insurance
premiums. This would undermine the punishment aspect of puni-
tive damages and contravene public policy.7 8 Similarly, if the
courts allowed a RICO defendant to avail himself of insurance cov-
erage for his RICO liability, the deterrent effect of the treble dam-
age award would be substantially diminished, if not eliminated.
Knowledge that an insurance policy would cover any subsequent
judgment erases the threat of being held liable for a RICO
violation.
Allowing insurance coverage for RICO damages would make
available to the plaintiff the assets of the insurance company,
thereby increasing the likelihood of recovering full compensation.
Nonetheless, allowing a defendant to insure himself against crimi-
nal conduct violates public policy.79 Removing direct liability from
the wrongdoer and imposing it on society contravenes the deter-
rent goal of RICO. Society as a whole, through insurance premi-
ums, would pay for the criminal conduct of a few. Even where a
policy's language is broad enough to include RICO treble damages,
the law should not allow coverage. Allowing coverage would give
wrongdoers free reign to obtain insurance to cover their wrongful
activity, thereby absolving themselves of all personal liability. This
would seriously frustrate the purposes and effectiveness of RICO.
E. Contribution and Indemnification
A right of contribution80 arises under federal law in one of two
ways: through the affirmative creation of a right of action by Con-
77 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (insured brought garnishment action against insurer to
recover under an automobile insurance policy; the court held that public policy prohibited
construing policy as covering liability for punitive damages).
78 Id. at 434.
79 See Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE LJ.
1, 52 (1980); Note, Insurance Against the Assessment of Punitive Damages, 20 U. MIAMI L. REv.
192 (1965). A substantive violation of RICO necessarily involves the commission of at least
two predicate acts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964 (1982). The patterns of racketeering necessary
for a RICO violation may be grouped into four broad, but not mutually exclusive, groups:
(1) violence, (2) provision of illegal goods and services, (3) corruption in the labor move-
ment or among public officials, and (4) commercial and other forms of fraud. See Civil
Action, supra note 19, at 300-306.
80 Contribution is an equitable remedy that permits a person who has discharged more
than a fair share of a common liability to recover from another who is also liable for the
wrong. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1981).
No right to contribution existed at common law for joint tortfeasors. W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 10, at 336; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(A)(3) (1979). This
common law rule was based on the notion that as between joint tortfeasors, the law should
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gress, either expressly or impliedly, or through the power of the
courts to fashion a federal common law of contribution.8 1 Nothing
in RICO refers to a right of contribution. If the right exists, it must
be an implied right or a common law right fashioned by the courts.
The Supreme Court decided contribution was not available
under the antitrust laws in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radclif Materials.s2
The Court noted that because the antitrust statutes are silent as to a
right of contribution, the Court had to determine whether an im-
plied right existed. After reviewing the legislative history and con-
sidering other relevant factors, 83 the Court concluded that
Congress neither explicitly nor impliedly intended to create a right
of contribution.8 4 The Court next considered whether the right of
contribution fell within the exceptions to the general rule that there
is no federal common law.8 5 Federal common law exists only in
those narrow areas in which a federal rule of decision is necessary
to protect uniquely federal interests or those areas where Congress
has given the courts the power to formulate substantive law.8 6 The
Court concluded that contribution does not fall into one of the ex-
ceptions to the rule that there is no federal common law because it
does not implicate " 'uniquely federal interests' of the kind that
oblige courts to formulate federal common law." 87 Finally, the
court neither accepted nor rejected the policy concerns presented
by both parties in Texas Industries surrounding the right to contribu-
tion. "[R]egardless of the merits of the conflicting arguments [the
not lend its aid to have one tortfeasor compel others to share in the damage judgment
intended to compensate the victims.
81 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 90-91 (no right to contribution under Equal Pay Act of
1963 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; court declined to fashion a right under
federal common law). See generally Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U.
PA. L. REV. 130, 130-134 (1932).
82 451 U.S. 630 (1981). A purchaser of concrete sued Texas Industries alleging con-
spiracy to raise concrete prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and sought treble
damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Texas Industries sought contribution from Radcliff
Industries, a co-conspirator.
83 The Court considered the identity of the class for whose benefit the statute was en-
acted, the overall legislative scheme, and the traditional role of the states in providing re-
lief. Id. at 639. The Court noted that the antitrust laws were enacted, not for the benefit of
participants in a conspiracy to restrain trade, but for the protection and benefit of an en-
tirely distinct class. Id. Second, the Court pointed out that damages were intended to deter
future wrongdoers, not ameliorate wrongdoers' liability. Id. Finally, the Court considered
the absence of any reference in the legislative history that Congress was concerned with
softening the blow on joint wrongdoers. Finding none, the Court concluded that Congress
did not expressly or impliedly intend to create a right of contribution. Id.
84 Id. at 640.
85 Id.
86 Id. Those uniquely federal rights that allow an exception to the rule that there is no
common law are the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international
disputes, and admiralty cases. Id. at 641-42.
87 Id. at 642.
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NOTES
right to contribution] is a matter for Congress, not the courts, to
resolve."s8
Like the antitrust laws, RICO does not provide an express or
implied right to contribution. 89 Nor does a right to contribution
under RICO fall into one of the instances where the federal courts
have the power to formulate federal common law. Contribution
under RICO does not involve "uniquely federal interests" that
oblige the courts to formulate a federal common law.90 Moreover,
nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended
the courts to have the power to formulate such a right.9 1 In Boone v.
Beacon Building Corp.,92 the United States District Court of New
Jersey applied the reasoning of Texas Industries to deny the right to
contribution in a RICO action. The court found that no right to
contribution under RICO exists. The court reasoned that because
of the absence of any congressional intent to ameliorate the liability
of wrongdoers and the continuing existence of the antitrust statu-
tory scheme without amendment, upon which RICO was modeled,
defendants have no right to contribution under RICO.93
A similar analysis applies to claims for indemnity. The right to
indemnity under RICO could arise as an implied right under the
statute or as part of the federal common law. 94 RICO, however,
does not create an implied cause ofaction for indemnity, nor does a
claim for indemnity qualify as a uniquely federal interest.95 Thus,
courts should not create a right to indemnity.96
88 Id. at 646.
89 Neither RICO's text nor legislative history mention the right to contribution or a
desire to soften the blow of liability to wrongdoers. See Boone v. Beacon Bldg. Corp., 613
F. Supp. 1151, 1154-55 (D.N.J. 1985) (no right to contribution under RICO). That Con-
gress knew how to create a right to contribution is evidenced by the express actions for
contribution under § I 1() of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1982), and
§§ 9(e) and 18(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e) and 78r(b)
(1982).
90 Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). Civil RICO pro-
vides a private cause of action to redress private injuries. RICO actions do not involve
rights or obligations of the United States, interstate or international disputes, or admiralty.
See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
91 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 645.
92 613 F. Supp. 1151 (D.NJ. 1985). Purchasers of homes in the vicinity of a toxic land-
fill sued the builders, realtors, landfill operators, and the township. Numerous co-defend-
ants cross-claimed against the township for contribution and indemnification.
93 Id. at 1155. See also Miller v. Affiliated Financial Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1003, 1004
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (no contribution under federal RICO).
94 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 451
U.S. 77, 90-95 (1981).
95 Central Ill. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dupage County Bank, 622 F. Supp. 1493, 1498-99
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (RICO primarily affects only the division of liability between private par-
ties). See also Miller, 624 F. Supp. at 1004 (no indemnification under federal RICO).
96 Dupage County Bank, 622 F. Supp. at 1500 (no indemnity for intentional tortfeasor).
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Were Congress to address the issues of contribution and in-
demnification 97 in light of the purposes of RICO, they should cre-
ate a right to contribution, but decline to create a right to
indemnification. Allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors in-
creases the likelihood that most or all wrongdoers will be held lia-
ble and thus share the consequences of the wrong.98 Contribution
would thus promote private enforcement and thereby increase de-
terrence. 99 Maximizing enforcement and deterrence enhances the
remedial goals of RICO. Congress, on the other hand, should deny
a right to indemnity. Allowing a wrongdoer to escape all liability by
passing on his liability to another would seriously frustrate RICO's
purposes of enforcement and deterrence.100 Indemnification could
undo the law's judgment and undermine enforcement efforts, and
therefore should not be allowed under RICO. 10 1
III. Computing the Final Treble Damage Award
Several issues also arise concerning the computation of the fi-
nal treble damage award in a RICO cause of action. Resolving
these issues turns on the characterization and liberal construction
of the treble damage provision. Determining solutions to these
computation problems with the treble damages' purposes foremost
in mind will further RICO's underlying goals.
A. Prejudgment Interest
On its face, RICO does not provide for prejudgment interest.
When faced with the decision of whether it should award prejudg-
97 Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have fashioned rules of contribution;
ten initially through judicial action, the remainder through legislation. Northwest Airlines,
451 U.S. at 87 n.17.
98 See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1-9, 12 U.L.A. 57-107
(1975 & Supp. 1986). This Model Act may not be sufficient, however, to provide a statutory
right to contribution under RICO because § l(b) denies a right to contribution to any
tortfeasor who intentionally (willfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury.
Nonetheless, it may serve as a guide. Furthermore, should the legislature decide to provide
a right to contribution under RICO, it should remove the procedure for obtaining contri-
bution from the cause of action for damages between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Otherwise, the focus of the litigation may shift from the plaintiff's cause of action and claim
for damages to the issue of liability among the tortfeasors. The right to contribution
should be allowed if it increases deterrence and insures that all wrongdoers risk exposure
to liability. All efforts, however, should be made to prevent it from interfering with the
plaintiff's cause of action and right to recovery.
99 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 636.
100 See Stone, supra note 79, at 47-56. "It is better that lawmakers, prosecutors, and
sentencing authorities act responsibly in deciding what is, and what is not, a delict for which
the agent should be the final bearer of the risk. Once that decision is made, after due
consideration ... it is in principle senseless to stand by and allow the enterprise partici-
pants, by agreement among themselves, to deflect the collective judgment." Id. at 51.
101 Id. at 55.
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ment interest in other areas of the law, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held that:
In the absence of an unequivocal prohibition of interest on such
obligations, this Court has fashioned rules which granted or de-
nied interest on particular statutory obligations by an appraisal
of the congressional purpose in imposing them and in the light
of general principles deemed relevant by the Court. 0 2
Courts that have considered the availability of prejudgment in-
terest where a statute provides for doubling or trebling the dam-
ages have first determined whether the damages were intended as
remedial or penal.'0 3 Because Congress explicitly characterized
RICO treble damages as remedial, courts should award prejudg-
ment interest. 104 Not only is the availability of interest consistent
with the overall remedial purposes of RICO, it is also consistent
with the compensatory goal of the treble damage provision because
prejudgment interest makes the plaintiff whole.' 0 5
102 Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947) (citing Royal Indem. Co. v.
United States, 313 U.S. 289, 295-97; Board of Comm'rs ofJackson County v. United States,
308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939)). See also Philip Carey Mfg. Co., Miami Cabinet Div. v. NLRB, 331
F.2d 720, 729 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964).
103 Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 638 F.2d 661, 663 (3d Cir. 1981)
(prejudgment interest recoverable under patent law). But see United States v. Globe Re-
modeling Co., 196 F. Supp. 652, 658 (D. Vt. 1960) (supp. op. 1961) (interest not recover-
able under False Claims Act action for multiple damages).
104 See text accompanying note 24 supra; Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697
(1945) (doubled unpaid wages are liquidated damages under Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938).
Interest awarded to compensate victims for deprivation of the monetary value of their
loss actually has two components: prejudgment interest and postjudgment interest. Inter-
est from the date of the loss until the date ofjudgment is prejudgment interest and can be
viewed either as interest or as an element of damages. Postjudgment interest, on the other
hand, is usually provided for by statute for liquidated claims for the loss of the use of money
from the date of judgment until paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). See Handgards, Inc. v.
Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1300 (9th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff entitled only to postjudgment
interest from date of first judgment to date of second judgment because the claim was not
liquidated until the first judgment), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 963 (1985).
Thus, in a RICO claim, the court must decide if the claim is liquidated and whether the
plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of injury to the date ofjudgment.
Where the RICO claim resembles a common law tort rather than contract damages, the
plaintiff cannot recover interest for delay in payment because the damages are not assessed
until the date of trial. Contractor Utility Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Corp., 748 F.2d 1151,
1157-58 (7th Cir. 1984) (prejudgment interest denied in fraud action), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1397 (1985).
105 Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 638 F.2d 661, 663 (3d Cir. 1981)
(patent infringement).
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Once the court determines within its discretion 10 6 that a plain-
tiff is entitled to prejudgment interest, 0 7 the problem becomes one
of computing it. A liberal computation of prejudgment interest al-
lows the court to base the amount of interest on the actual damage
amount, then add the amount of interest to the other damages and
multiply the total amount by three.'08 A restrictive construction of
the rule results in a lower amount because it requires the court to
compute the prejudgment interest on the amount of actual dam-
ages, treble the actual damages, and then add to it the amount of
prejudgment interest. 0 9
The policies behind RICO and the purposes for a private cause
of action suggest that courts take the liberal view in computing pre-
judgment interest in RICO actions. A broad remedial interpreta-
tion treats the loss of the use of money as an element of harm as
easily measurable as lost profits or lost sales." 0 While Congress
did not specifically enumerate this in RICO, Congress directed that
the courts construe the remedy provision broadly."' In addition, a
liberal construction acknowledges that prejudgment interest is an
element of damages that courts should add with all other damages
before trebling to compute the final award." 12
106 The decision to award prejudgment interest in a particular case lies within the trial
judge's discretion. Lodges 743 & 1746 v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 446 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1266, 1275
(D.D.C. 1981).
107 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962). Courts award prejudgment interest in
federal actions where the damages are derived from a pecuniary injury and the court can
determine the amount of damages with reasonable certainty. United Aircraft, 534 F.2d at
447.
108 For example: actual damages ($100,000) x interest (10%) = prejudgment interest
($10,000). (Actual damages ($100,000) + prejudgment interest ($10,000)) x 3 = total
award ($330,000). Cf. note 109 infra.
109 For example: actual damages ($100,000) x interest (10%) = prejudgment interest
($10,000). (Actual damages ($100,000) x 3 = treble damages (300,000). Prejudgment in-
terest ($10,000) + treble damages ($300,000) = total award ($310,000).
110 General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 656 (1983) (patent infringe-
ment suit); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (patent infringement suit; prejudgment interest awarded to compensate for de-
lay in payment of damages); see Note, Insurer's Liability for Prjudgment Interest: A Modern Ap-
proach, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 617 (1983).
111 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
112 See Hanna v. American Motors Corp., 724 F.2d 1300, 1311 (7th Cir.) (because Con-
gress instructed that courts construe the Viet Nam Era Veterans' Ready Assistance Act of
1974 liberally, prejudgment interest was a proper ingredient of the "make whole" remedy




Punitive damages serve to punish particularly egregious con-
duct.' 13 In a RICO civil action, punitive damages could be used to
punish wrongdoers for particularly flagrant violations of RICO.
The first question is whether punitive damages can be awarded in
addition to treble damages under federal law. 114 If not, they may
still be awarded under state law. Where state law permits recovery
of punitive damages, punitive damages could be awarded if a state
claim is joined with the federal RICO claim.' 15
Some courts may refuse to award punitive damages in addition
to treble damages on the grounds that punitive damages would du-
plicate the treble damage award." 6 This view, however, confuses
the purposes of a treble damage award with the purpose of punitive
damages. Such a rule reads into treble damages a punishment ef-
fect never intended by Congress. Punitive damages do not dupli-
cate treble damages either in purpose or in characteristics." 7
Punitive damages are a discretionary award used to punish the will-
ful, wanton conduct of a defendant. Moreover, Congress intended
treble damages not as a means for punishing the defendant, but as
a remedy for the plaintiff.118
113 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10, at
§ 2; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at § 77.
114 Punitive damages are normally available in federal courts. Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 22 (1980). In some areas of the law, however, courts have not allowed punitive
damages. See, e.g., Local 20 Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (where state
law displaced by federal law, no punitive damages); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d
873, 888 (8th Cir. 1979) (antitrust) (citing without further analysis Hansen Packing Co. v.
Armour & Co., 16 F. Supp. 784, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1936)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
In Hansen, however, the plaintiff sought trebled punitive damages. The court dis-
missed the claim for trebled punitive damages, but provided no analysis for its holding.
The court simply stated that "[i]n trebling the amount of actual damages, it seems indispu-
table that the statutes carry their own symbol of punishment. The plaintiff can only recover
what the statutes give him." Id. Courts should dismiss a claim for trebled punitive dam-
ages; but not because punitive damages are not allowed in an antitrust cause of action.
Punitive damages serve a different function than treble damages and should be computed
separately, but both should be recoverable.
115 See notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
116 See Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1170 n.16 (5th
Cir. 1984). The court raised the question whether both treble damages and punitive dam-
ages could be awarded but declined to answer it within the procedural posture of the case.
117 See notes 10, 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
118 116 CONG. REc. 36,296 (1970) (Sen. Doyle) (RICO will prove to be an effective de-
terrent); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969) (While "it is necessary... to free
the channels of commerce from predatory activities, .. . there [was] no intent to visit pun-
ishment on any individual: the purpose [was] civil. Punishment as such [was] limited to the
criminal remedies."). See also Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 157 (1899) ("Although punish-
ment, in a certain and very limited sense, may be the result of the statute ... so far as the
wrongdoer is concerned, it [is] clear such is not its chief purpose, which is the award of
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When the circumstances justify a punitive damage award in ad-
dition to the treble damages authorized by section 1964(c), the
court should award both, either under federal or state law. 1 9 Al-
lowing punitive damage awards in addition to treble damages does
not usurp or thwart the compensatory and enforcement purposes
of RICO's treble damages. In fact, punitive damages may enhance
the deterrence effect of RICO's treble damages by discouraging
others from engaging in sophisticated crime.
Even if the federal courts determine that punitive damages are
not recoverable in addition to RICO treble damages, where state
law permits recovery of punitive damages, a court may award puni-
tive damages if the plaintiff joins a state claim with the federal
RICO claim.12° In such a case, the problem will be one of
computation.
The language of the statute resolves the computation problem.
Section 1964(c) enables a plaintiff to recover threefold the damages he
sustains.'2 1 Because punitive damages are not based upon the harm
suffered by the plaintiff, but instead upon an amount adjudged nec-
essary to punish the wrongdoer, they do not duplicate treble dam-
ages. Punitive damages awarded on either a state claim or under
federal RICO are not part of the damages the plaintiff sustains.
Therefore, courts should not treble punitive damages but should
award them in addition to the treble damages when justified by the
circumstances.
C. Settlements
A third computation problem arises when multiple defendants
are involved in a RICO suit and some but not all of the defendants
settle with the plaintiff before trial. When a court renders a judg-
ment against any remaining defendants, the treatment of the settle-
damages .. ."). See generally Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble
Damage Antitrust Action, 14 SETON L. REV. 17 (1983).
119 See Banderas v. Banco Central del Equador, 461 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(court affirmed four million dollar treble damages award plus an eight million dollar puni-
tive damage award in foreign exchange fraud under Florida RICO).
120 RICO's remedies supplement, rather than supplant, other federal or state remedies.
See note 28 supra and accompanying text. Several state RICO statutes explicitly provide for
the recovery of punitive damages. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(7) (West Supp. 1986); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-3406 (1981 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-30.5-5(b)(1), (b)(4)
(West 1983 & Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-43-9(6) (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 946.86(4) (Supp. 1985-86).
Where state law provides for punitive damages, either under the state RICO statute or
a common law claim, courts may award punitive damages if the plaintiffjoins the state law
violation with the federal RICO claim. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th
Cir.) (securities law), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which explicitly prohibits recovery in excess of actual damages, does not bar a state claim
for punitive damages. Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 1972).
121 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
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ment amount may affect their individual liability and the plaintiffs
total recovery.
The damage award could be computed in one of two ways. The
court could subtract the amount of the settlement from the plain-
tiffs actual damages before trebling. Alternatively, the court could
subtract the amount of the settlement from the trebled amount.1 22
For example, if a plaintiff's legal damages amount to $100,000 and
two of the four co-defendants settle with the plaintiff before trial for
$15,000 each, the final award will depend upon the method of cal-
culation used. If the court deducts the settlement payments before
trebling, the remaining co-defendants will be liable for $210,000.123
By including the $30,000 settlement, the plaintiff will recover a to-
tal of 240,000. If, however, the court deducts the settlement
payments after trebling, the remaining co-defendants will be re-
sponsible for the $270,000 and the plaintiff will recover a total of
$300,000.124
The statute's language provides the clearest solution to this is-
sue. Subsection 1964(c) entitles any person injured in their busi-
ness or property to recover threefold the damages he sustains.125 The
statute defines the amount of recovery to which the plaintiff is enti-
tled as being three times the amount of his injuries.
The United States Supreme Court faced this issue in calculat-
ing a double damage award under the False Claims Act.1 26 The
Supreme Court held in United States v. Bornstein127 that doubling the
damages before deducting any pretrial payments best comports
with Congress' judgment that double damages were necessary to
make victims whole. 128 Similarly, deducting the settlement amount
122 Compare Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mech. Eng., 635 F.2d 118, 130 (2d
Cir. 1980) (damages in antitrust actions determined by trebling the damages, then deduct-
ing the amount paid in settlement), afd, 456 U.S. 556 (1982) with United States v. Klein,
230 F. Supp. 426, 443 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (damages under False Claims Act determined by
taking credits against the actual damages and then doubling the remainder).
123 100,000 - 30,000 = 70,000 x 3 = 210,000.
124 100,000 x 3 = 300,000 - 30,000 = 270,000. Including the settlement amount of
$30,000, the plaintiff recovers $300,000.
125 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
126 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982).
127 423 U.S. 303 (1976). The United States brought an action under the False Claims
Act against a subcontractor to recover a forfeiture of $2,000 plus an amount equal to
double the amount of damages sustained on account of a false claim presented to the
United States. The Supreme Court held that the damages were to be doubled before any
compensatory payments previously made were subtracted. The Court reasoned that the
focus of the forfeiture provision was on the conduct of the person from whom the govern-
ment sought to collect the forfeiture so that the United States could collect three of the
$2,000 forfeitures for the three shipments.
128 423 U.S. at 315. See also Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 391-95
(4th Cir. 1982) (rejects defense of claim reduction; settlement proceeds to be deducted
after trebling actual damages in antitrust cause of action), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983);
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from the trebled amount also comports with Congress' purpose be-
hind RICO's treble damages and ensures that the plaintiff receives
the full amount of compensation to which RICO entitles him.1 29
The alternative calculation, which subtracts the settlement amount
before trebling, results in a smaller total recovery than by deduct-
ing the settlement after trebling the actual damages. The alterna-
tive calculation also puts a premium on litigation and discourages
settlement agreements. 30 Thus, to fulfill RICO's goal of compen-
sation and to avoid punishing those who compromise by settle-
ments, the settlement payments should be deducted after trebling.
IV. Conclusion
Faced with a problem of national dimensions, and the knowl-
edge that the available "sanctions and remedies" were "limited in
scope and impact,"'' Congress sought in RICO "to establish ...
new remedies"' 3 2 sufficient to redress the wrong and remove the
evil. Courts should keep RICO's broad remedial purposes fore-
most in mind when resolving issues that touch on the use of treble
damages in a RICO action.
"[T]he Office of all the Judges is always to make such... con-
struction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy,
and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of
the mischief .... and to add force and life to the cure and remedy,
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act."' 133 Courts
should not restrict their view of the treble damage tool by tradi-
tional damage principles, but should construe RICO liberally
enough to accomplish RICO's broad remedial purposes.
Judith A. Morse
Wainwright v. Kraftco. Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (antitrust co-conspirators
liable for entire amount of damages reduced by settlement after trebling).
129 Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1957) ("It is not the policy of
the law to encourage litigation at the expense of compromise."), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957).
130 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
131 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923.
132 Id.
133 Heyden's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584).
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